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ABSTRACT
A number of trademark holders have recently challenged the
policies of Google and other Internet search engines that allow the
trademark owner’s competitors to purchase advertising space
linked specifically to the owner’s trademarks when entered as
search terms. This iBrief examines the application of trademark
law to this practice and concludes that Google would be
contributorially liable for trademark infringement only when the
advertising links lead to consumer confusion about the identity of
the advertiser.

INTRODUCTION
¶1
Internet search engines have become one of the most important
tools for many users of the World Wide Web. Search engines help web
surfers locate online content and are often the first place many people go to
start an Internet session. The popularity of search engines makes the
Internet search industry a lucrative business, best exemplified by the fervor
over the recent Google IPO. A major source of income for many of the
most popular search engines, including Google, is the sale of advertisements
placed on the search results page.2 However, the search engines’ practice of
selecting ads to display based on the search terms entered by the user has
recently come under fire.3 In April 2004 Google began to allow advertisers
to purchase the right to have their ads linked to trademarked terms entered
into the search field, even if the advertisers were not the trademark holders.4
The trademark owners have protested, many of them filing lawsuits
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claiming trademark infringement, unfair competition, and trademark
dilution.5 This iBrief examines the issue of keyword-linked advertising and
concludes that Google and other search engines will be contributorily liable
for trademark infringement only when the advertisement conceals the
identity of the advertiser such that the consumer is confused about the
source of the ad.

I. BACKGROUND: INTERNET ADVERTISING
¶2
One of the critical steps in effective advertising is placing the ad
where interested consumers may see it. Advertisers utilize many methods
to get their ads in front of consumers. One method that has been a subject
of trademark litigation is the use of pop-up ads – those additional browser
windows that open during an Internet session.6 A number of trademark
suits have been initiated based on programs that create pop-up ads based on
search terms entered or websites visited.7 Website owners whose sites are
among those used to trigger the pop-up ads of competing third-parties claim
that the practice infringes their trademarks and copyrights.8 The issue of
liability in these cases is apparently very close to call, as some courts have
denied claims of infringement,9 while other courts have ordered injunctions
of the practice.10
¶3
Much like pop-up ads that are linked to a specific website,
keyword-linked advertising in search engines is another way to provide
relevant, client-specific ads to Internet users. When visitors to a search
engine enter their search terms, advertisements are placed on the search
results page depending on the search terms entered.11 This practice helps
advertisers reach an interested audience since the ads are displayed only
when the desired search terms are entered; however, like the website owners
in the pop-up cases, trademark owners are unhappy when competitors’ ads
are linked to the owner’s trademarks.12 Yet, unlike the pop-up cases, where
the offending ad appeared in a separate browser window than that of the
trademark holder, the linked ads are displayed on the search results page,

5

Id.
Andrew J. Sinclair, Legal Update: Third Party Pop-up Advertisements: UHaul Int’l, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 10 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 198, 198 (2004).
7
E.g. U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 279 F. Supp. 2d 723, 723 (E.D. Va.
2003); Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, 293 F. Supp. 2d 734, 734 (E.D.
Mich. 2003); 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467, 467
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
8
Sinclair, supra note 6.
9
E.g. U-Haul, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 731.
10
E.g. 1-800 Contacts, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 509-10.
11
Klein & Mazur, supra note 4.
12
Id.
6

2005

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 21

thus precluding the argument that the ad is separate and distinct from the
window containing the desired content.13
Prior to 2004, Google denied advertisers the ability to link their ads
to the trademarks of others.14 However, Google recently modified its adlinking policy to allow advertisers to bid on the chance to have their ads
associated with any keyword, even if those keywords are trademarks owned
by a competitor.15 Soon after this policy change, the recent flurry of
litigation concerning the issue ensued.16 In its defense, Google is not
allowing unbridled use of trademarks, as the company still “reviews
trademark complaints that relate to the content of the keyword ads, [just]
not the keywords purchased to trigger the ads.”17 However, the owners of
the protected marks are still arguing that even by simply allowing a
competitor to sponsor an ad associated with trademarked terms, the search
engines are allowing competitors to take unfair advantage of interest
associated with the marks.18 For example, eBay has requested that all
keywords that use eBay’s trademark be unavailable to advertisers.19 This
request is not uncommon and many trademark owners are seeking judicial
intervention to prevent the use of their trademarks in this manner.
¶4

¶5
A few recent decisions in French courts on this issue awarded
damages to trademark owners against Google finding the keyword-linked
advertising practice constitutes infringement.20 Luckily for Google, though,
U.S. courts have been less sympathetic to trademark owners than their
Western European counterparts.21 For instance, Google recently won a
partial victory in a trademark dispute in the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia.22 Although concluding that certain aspects of
Google’s practices in this case may lead to liability under the Lanham Act,
the court held that the plaintiff was unable to prove that “the mere use by
Google of the [plaintiff’s] trademark as a search term or keyword, even in
the context of Google’s advertising program, violates either the Lanham Act
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or Virginia common law.”23 As will be explained below, this ruling should
be the sign of things to come in future disputes on the topic.

II. LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
A. Trademark Law
¶6
Trademarks have been used for centuries by merchants attempting
to identify themselves as the source of their goods.24 The United States has
protected trademark rights in some form since 1870. Congress has
gradually increased the power of the trademark statutes to its present form,
the Lanham Act,25 to provide progressively greater protection to trademark
owners.26 Section 32 of the Lanham Act outlines what constitutes
infringing use of trademarks, and prohibits any use in commerce of a
registered mark or imitation thereof that “is likely to cause confusion, or to
cause mistake, or to deceive.”27 Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act further
serves to protect trademark owners from competitors’ attempts to pass off
their own product or service as the trademarked version.28

Thus, the likelihood of confusion plays an important role in
determining whether a competitor’s use of a mark is an infringing use. In
many of the cases dealing with an issue such as keyword-linked advertising,
however, there is little chance that a consumer will be confused about the
source of the products or services the competing ads promote.29 Even if a
user is misdirected to a competitor’s Internet site, the mistake will likely be
discovered quickly and, with the ease of navigating the Internet, the user
can easily backtrack. Despite this minimal harmful effect, courts have
found that the initial confusion as to the source of a product or service may
still be enough to assess liability for trademark infringement.30
¶7

¶8
The most noted decision on this issue of “initial interest confusion”
is Brookfield Communications v. West Coast Entertainment.31 In
Brookfield, West Coast Entertainment registered the domain name
moviebuff.com despite the fact that Brookfield had a registered trademark
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for its entertainment industry software product “MovieBuff.”32 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that although users
arriving at West Coast’s moviebuff.com website would realize that the site
was not associated with Brookfield’s MovieBuff software, the initial
interest confusion caused by West Coast’s use of the mark caused some
damage to Brookfield.33 The court noted that “the use of another’s
trademark in a manner calculated ‘to capture initial consumer attention,
even though no actual sale is finally completed as a result of the confusion,
may be still [sic] an infringement.’”34 This holding shows that any action
taken to divert the consumer’s attention to one’s product by using the name
and reputation of a competitor’s product is improper for “the fact that there
is only initial consumer confusion does not alter the fact that [the infringer]
would be misappropriating [the mark-holder’s] acquired goodwill.”35 Thus,
the protections afforded by the trademark statute are interpreted broadly to
protect the interest of the trademark owner.

B. Keyword-Linked Advertising
¶9
The primary issue in online advertising cases tends to be whether
the ad creates confusion as to its source.36 Thus, the test in Brookfield is
whether the accused infringer used the plaintiff’s mark “in a manner
calculated to capture initial consumer attention.”37 In the context of
keyword-linked search results, infringing ads are the ones that fail to
identify the true source of the ad, either by falsely identifying the ad as
being from the trademark holder or by giving no indication as to the source
of the ad.38 If there is no uncertainty as to the source of the ads, though,
there is no likelihood of confusion.
¶10
Additional factors may also be considered when determining
whether the consumer will be confused as to the source of the ads. The ads
can be placed in a separate location from the general search results under
the heading “Sponsored Links.” This placement alerts web surfers to the
fact that the ads are not a part of the search results. Further, unlike
trademarks within domain names or HTML metatags, online advertisements
are more readily identifiable to most Internet users due to the great volume
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of online advertising today.39 Many consumers frequently ignore ads and
look immediately to the search results.40 These additional factors, together
with the content of legitimate ads will leave little possibility of initial
confusion. Of course, ads that intentionally conceal their source increase
the likelihood of confusion, but the placement of ads and the consumer
savvy of many Internet users act to diminish this likelihood.41

III. FAIR USE
A. Trademark Law
¶11
While trademark owners are granted substantial deference in
infringement disputes, the monopolistic control over the use of their marks
is not absolute. The Lanham Act provides fair use limitations to the
protections afforded to trademarks.42 In an Internet setting, most cited
instances of the fair use defense involve the nominative use of a trademark
in domain names, websites, and HTML metatags. Nominative uses are
those uses of a trademark by a party intended solely “to describe not its own
product, but the [trademark owner]’s.”43 For example, a nominative use
may convey biographical information in relation to the trademarked product
or service or compare the competitor’s product or service to the
trademarked brand.

One recent high-profile example of such a use is Playboy
Enterprises, Inc. v. Terri Welles.44 In Welles, the defendant was a former
Playboy playmate who described herself as such on her personal website.45
Playboy asserted that the use of the “Playboy” and “Playmate” marks may
give visitors to Welles’ site the wrongful impression that the site was
sponsored by Playboy.46 The court thought otherwise and held that the use
of Playboy’s marks both on the website and in the website’s metatags was
purely nominative and therefore fair use.47 This result illustrates how the
fair use limitations to trademark protection prevent a trademark owner from
extending his rights to foreclose legitimate, non-trademark uses of his mark.
¶12
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B. Keyword-Linked Advertising
¶13
As opposed to a trademark use that intentionally causes confusion
as to the source of the product or service, many advertisers wish to identify
themselves as competitors of the trademark holder. As noted in Welles,
trademark uses that serve only to identify the trademark owner’s product or
service or are used in comparative advertising qualify as fair use and are not
subject to infringement claims.48 There are many possible applications of
keyword-linked advertising that would fall into this category of use,
including ads for services supplementary to the trademarked product or
service (e.g. Volkswagen repairman) and ads comparing a trademarked
product to a competitor’s.

Many trademark-holders that are complaining about the keywordlinking practice are requesting that the search engines disallow all use of
their trademarks as keywords.49 However, providing a complete bar to the
use of all trademark references as keywords for ad-linking would be overinclusive in denying any legitimate fair use defenses to accusations of
infringement. For instance, the owner of a site that sells eBay management
software argued that creating such a bar would unfairly stifle legitimate
competition.50 He reiterated a common analogy used to defend fair uses of
trademarks: “How do you say that you repair Volkswagens without saying
Volkswagen?”51 Thus, the equitable solution seems to be somewhere
between the current laissez-faire practice and a complete end to the
availability of trademarks in keyword-linked ads.
¶14

¶15
Google has been willing to “perform a limited investigation and
respect[s] ‘reasonable’ requests to remove trademark terms from the
bidding process.”52 Search engine provider Yahoo limits its keywordlinked ad sales even further, only permitting use by an advertiser whose
“website refers to the trademark or its owner in a permissive nominative
manner without creating confusion, or if the keyword is generic or merely
descriptive.”53 Such practices that take an active, although responsive,
approach to preventing infringement could ensure that legitimate
competitive uses of the keyword-linked advertising are protected.
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IV. CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT
A. Trademark Law
¶16
While trademark law in the U.S. has developed to protect a markholder’s rights, its provisions are generally focused on assigning liability to
those who personally infringe protected marks. There is little that may be
used to assign liability to those who merely enable infringement by others.
This contributory liability is well-established in copyright law, but the
doctrine is not as commonly applied in a trademark setting. “[N]either
section 32 nor section 43(a) explicitly mentions contributory
infringement,”54 and as such, “the Lanham Act’s test for infringement is
not particularly well suited for dealing with parties other than the person
who actually sells to the ultimate consumer.”55 To remedy this situation, the
Supreme Court developed a test for liability as a contributor to infringement
in Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc.,56 stating “liability
for trademark infringement can extend beyond those who actually mislabel
goods with the mark of another.”57 In Inwood, the manufacturer of a
generic drug produced its product with the same coloring and general
appearance as the brand name drug sold by the plaintiff.58 The evidence at
trial indicated that even though the generic’s manufacturer did not label its
product with the plaintiff’s trademark, some pharmacists had intentionally
mislabeled the generic drug as the brand name version and were selling it as
such.59 The plaintiff contested that the design of the generic drug
contributed to the infringing action taken by the pharmacists.60 The
defendant manufacturer was not held liable for the actions of such
pharmacists, but the test for what actions would constitute contributory
infringement was established:

If a manufacturer or distributor intentionally induces another to
infringe a trademark, or if it continues to supply its product to one
whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark
infringement, the manufacturer or distributor is contributorially
responsible for any harm done as a result of the deceit.61
¶17
The rule presented in Inwood was later extended beyond situations
involving manufacturers and distributors. In Hard Rock Café Licensing
54
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Corp v. Concessions Services, Inc.,62 the operator of a flea market was sued
for the activity of counterfeiters in selling trademarked items from one of
the stalls of the flea market.63 Since the application of the Inwood rule was
not established outside the manufacture and distribution of goods, the court
applied tort law as to find liability only in cases where the operator knew or
had reason to know that the infringing activity was taking place.64
However, even though the defendant in this case would be liable if it had
known or should have known that the infringement was taking place, the
court imposed no affirmative duty to actively police the flea market to
prevent such activity.65
The Inwood standard was further extended to the Internet context in
Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc.66 In Lockheed, the
plaintiff trademark holder sued the domain name registrar for selling rights
to the domain names skunkworks.com, skunkwrks.com, and
skunkwerks.com even though the plaintiff owned the federally registered
service mark, SKUNK WORKS.67 The plaintiff referenced flea market
cases, such as Hard Rock, claiming that if the flea market operator has a
duty to investigate if he learns of counterfeiters at his location, the
defendant should likewise have a duty to investigate known occurrences of
trademark infringement in the domain names it registers.68 However, the
court noted that, unlike the continuous landlord-tenant relationship between
the infringer and the contributing party in the flea market context, the
relationship between the infringer and the domain name registrar ends once
the transaction is made.69 Since domain name registration alone does not
amount to trademark infringement, the expansion of Inwood to this context
was found inappropriate.70 Additionally, the court noted that even if the
Inwood standard were to apply to the domain name registrar, it would be
unreasonably difficult to monitor the entire Internet as opposed to simply
monitoring a flea market.71
¶18

B. Keyword-Linked Advertising
¶19
Since the search engines are not themselves performing the
infringing activity, the basis for liability would be as a contributor to
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infringement. According to the Inwood test, the search engine would be
liable if it “intentionally induces another to infringe a trademark, or if it
continues to supply its product to one whom it knows or has reason to know
is engaging in trademark infringement.”72 Thus, Google must first show it
did not intentionally induce infringement.73 The details of Google’s role in
the trademark activity seem to indicate this would not be difficult to show:
first, Google does not dictate what keywords are associated with an ad, the
advertiser chooses its own keywords; second, the advertiser is responsible
for the text of the ad, the source of the possible infringement; and lastly,
Google has stated its willingness to remove trademark terms from bidding
upon reasonable requests from trademark owners.74 Thus, Google is likely
to escape liability under this first prong of Inwood; nevertheless, Google
must then show that it did not continue to sell its ad space to advertisers it
knew or should have known were engaging in trademark infringement.
Such a showing can be made by comparison to the Lockheed case.75
An obvious similarity exists between the situation in Lockheed and
the current issue of keyword-linked ad sales due to the Internet context;
however, the court in Lockheed noted that it is the nature of the relationship
between the infringer and the contributing party that forms the basis for
contributory liability.76 In contrast to the situation in Lockheed, where the
relationship between the parties ended once the transaction was made, the
relationship between the advertiser and the search engine is a continuing
one and is therefore within the application of the Inwood test.77 In the
Google context, the relationship is much closer to that in the flea market
cases than the relationship detailed in Lockheed. Like stalls in a flea
market, the ads sold are stored on the search engine site, over which the
search provider exerts control.

¶20

Furthermore, the Lockheed court noted that even if the defendant
was liable in the domain name scenario, it could not be expected to monitor
the Internet.78 This reasoning is not due solely to the vast amount of
information on the Internet but due to the nature of the registrar’s
connection with the infringing material. Namely, the registrar does not
¶21
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provide “actual storage and communications for infringing material.”79
Google has argued that its role in the keyword-linking advertising practice
is similar to the defendant in Lockheed as a “pure machine-linking
function,” which would not be a trademark use.80 Again, the search engine
scenario is much more similar to a flea market than the entire Internet since
the ads are stored on the search engine’s servers.
¶22
Although the analogy equating the search engine to a flea market
seems closer than the comparison to the domain name case, the search
engines may still avoid the application of the Inwood test under certain
circumstances. The Lockheed court stated that the domain name registrar
had only a remote involvement with the potentially infringing uses since it
did not provide “actual storage and communications for infringing
material.”81 Therefore, Google could reasonably be held responsible only
for the material that is contained on Google’s site, such as the advertisement
itself, and not for any infringing material found on the advertiser’s linked
website. If the infringing activity is on the advertiser’s website and not in
the ad itself, the Lockheed reasoning would apply.

CONCLUSION
¶23
Keyword-linked advertising has become a popular way for
advertisers to reach their intended audiences. Many of the attacks on the
system by trademark-holders are little more than attempts to over-extend the
limited monopoly rights in the use of the trademark. The Lanham Act does
not restrict the fair use of a trademark in both nominative uses and
comparative advertising.82 Thus, many keyword-linked advertisements do
not give rise to infringement liability.
¶24
However, Google and its competitors are not able to completely
wash their hands of the trademark-linked ads situation. A contributory
infringement claim would be valid for those ads that conceal the
advertiser’s identity such that the consumer is confused as to the source of
the ad, even if just initially. In those situations, Google and other search
engines would be advised to continue the practice of removing such
infringing ads when alerted to their presence. While Hard Rock determined
there is no affirmative duty to take precautions against infringing activities,
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once knowledge of that activity is attained, a duty to remedy the situation
exists.83
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